

28 Nov 87

1958-60 - now - & 70

I have cut secrets. They have affected of themselves an important matter: the prob of more VNs

- of genocide, terrorism, torture
of US

- of environmental catastrophe
- of new "crisis"
- of US F-117 and small war was
 - of all-out TN war
 - of loss of control, ^{fallen alone} population,
+ of escalation to nuclear
and all-out war.

I have awarded

I propose to share those secrets.

Some I have awarded earlier

PP, some have been widely known.

others (unnoted) most are not; some have not before been awarded.

I have not leaked them yet systematically,
nor drawn their implications.

If one not random, unrelated hits.

What is kept secret has other characteristics;
it relates to other definite activities, above all -
on (Prins.)

To know the clients is not to know
hidden parts of a foreign policy.
it is to discover ~~the~~ a secret foreign
policy (and dominant power/interests strategies)
which

Note what has just been revealed about
CIA, after 25 years:

- 4 news
- Rusk / transcript
- SC will
- Cuban role

What was not publicly known in 1962 was:
= (of signif.)

Other interpretations are inevitable, some may be
better, later ones will be different (for me, too):
but they must come to terms with their
clients; and those who reject mine in favour of old ones
should ask it they know them. What and how the hit?

My events:

1. C+C: loose control } STABILITY PROBLEM
2. War plans: - nature } PREEMPTION
 - casualties projected
 - (Not we with) enforcement
3. C II - rules
 - rules accepted
4. Crisis study: rules
 - patterns
5. VN Escalation: Conspiracy* 1964-65 (lies)
6. VN Escalation as process: RT 1966-73-75:
 - (despite evidence and disillusionment) troops
7. N's secret plan to win. (1974)
8. N's use of secret teams, planes, WG
9. N's nuclear threats (1974. ^{know})

Info: public (little-known) knowledge: after 1974

- Chile, Cuba (Maoists), CIA, Assass., Indonesia
Khatmeh, Iran (South Africa, Israel...) (NFK assass?)
- Old nuclear PU threats (viz. Hiroshima).
- no IGG Ric (WACC)
- Construction of Stability, CF, SDI
(Hypothetical period: 1958-62)
- Revelations on Cuba II - Challenger, Chernobyl
- MILGRAM; KELMAN; KANNEMAN-Jerry; BISHOPS (CO) (mount)

* PDS: & oscillate between using policy-process
as a small (large) conspiracy, and mostly and
less more institutional less coherent like parties or even

5 Feb 88

My reaction to "Wangsun Conference":
(after talk with
Lij Hush)

1) I identify with the man trying to save
the half-peas. I ~~never~~ did my best to
save China, the satellites, the cities of Russia -

(But: What loyalty and helpfulness and
discretion and ideology had brought me to
that position)

- that man was an "old Nogi" who
had formulated the finish statutes (accurate
footing?)
- and brought me to possess the PP?!

2. Now my meetings I had been in ~~had been~~ were
that - at best, "elinating targets." - ON VN

- counting them now as my colleagues
and friends (Bamit + Rasin didn't, either)
- not copying, hoarding or scheming to
use those ~~the~~ documents of crimes, plotting ...

[I could have had all key ones of
1961-~~70~~, esp 64-68]

| How could I have remained an insider, kept
my mouth shut, on issues at VN?
I feel shame.

(Answers 3 for various people, not of me:

1. — no clear channel for publication —
(Helsinki: no way.)
not NYT, Wash Post; not Congress, tell

(Fullbright, spring '66? I was in VN)

(foreign? not UK. France? Effective?
(Reason)

A BOOK? Not likely.)

2. A single damning piece of paper could be
traced — don't run with a career.

(I was first to think of a massive leak!)

(No imitators.)

3. Note how little effect those who leaked
Final Solution (without documents or 'proof') had.